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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(2)(j) which states: 
The supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: orders, judgments, and decrees 
of any court of record over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The District Court entered a summary judgment denying 
Plaintiff Troy Darrington (hereinafter "Darrington") relief. The 
Honorable Richard Moffat held that Defendants Stanley L. Wade and 
Janet Wade (hereinafter "The Wades") were not negligent in 
causing Darrington's injuries as a matter of law when the facts 
were viewed in the light most favorable to Darrington. The Court 
also refused to reinstate a previous default decision which was 
entered because the Wades refused to cooperate in discovery for 
nearly four (4) years. From this decision Darrington appeals. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
failing to reinstate a default judginent entered because the 
respondent repeatedly failed to cooperate in discovery for nearly 
four (4) years? 
2. Did the district court exceed its authority in 
setting aside an entered default judgment pursuant to a Motion to 
Reconsider? 
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3. Do genuine issues of fact exist in this case which 
prevent the district court from entering a summary judgment as a 
matter of law? 
STATUTE AND RULES 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55(c): 
For good cause shown the court may set aside 
an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it 
aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provision of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion of a new 
trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
Court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings 
of the Court, jury or adverse 
party, or any Order of the Court, 
or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and 
whenever any on e or more of the 
jurors have been induced to assent 
to any general or special verdict, 
or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the Court, by 
resort to a determination by chance 
or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the 
Affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, 
material for the party making the 
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application, which he could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the 
trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate 
damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice 
(6) insUffic:[enCy 0f the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that I t i s against law. 
( 7) Error i n J aw. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion fc* - c-
trial shall be served not later than iw days 
after the entry of the judgment,, 
(c) Affidavits; time for fi ling. When the 
application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit, Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon 
affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after 
such service withi n which to serve opposing 
affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall e 
served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the 
court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation The court may permit 
reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 
10 days after entry of a judgment the court 
of its own initiative may order a new trial 
for any reason for which i t might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and 
in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor, 
(e) Motion to a] ter or amend a judgment. 
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
served not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment. 
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3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c): 
The motion shall be served at least ten (10) 
days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case Appellant Troy Darrington (hereinafter 
"Darrington") seeks $32,392.90 for injuries incurred at a 
skateboard park which was leased by the Respondents Stanley L. 
Wade and Janet Wade (hereinafter "the Wades"). The Wades have 
breached their standard of care toward Darrington and are liable 
for the principal amount of $32,392.90. Accordingly, the Summary 
Judgment entered by the District Court must be reversed and their 
previous Default Judgment reinstated. 
The disposition of the lower court was entered by the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat on or about May 25, 1989. Judge 
Moffat held that the Wades were not negligent toward Darrington 
and did not cause his injuries and therefore they were entitled 
to summary judgment. Upon the same reasoning, the Court refused 
to reinstate the previous default judgment entered against the 
Wades which was due to their refusals to cooperate in discovery 
for nearly four (4) years. 
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The Respondents, Stanley Wade and Janet Wade, own 
certain property on which a skateboard park was built. The 
Defendants entered into an agreement with a prior tenant to have 
the skateboard park built on their property. In describing this 
tenancy in a deposition, Mr. Wade testified: "The basic premise 
of the lease was that he was to build and construct a skateboard 
park." (Deposition of Stanley Wade, 18 March, 1988, on file with 
the Court, page 23, line 22-23; hereinafter referred to as "Wade 
Depo".) The property owned by the Wades with the skateboard park 
was released by them as a skateboard park business approximately 
three (3) or four (4) different times. On May 20, 1983 the Wades 
leased the premises, to Bob Iverson who was also a Defendant in 
this case. (Wade depo, Exhibit 3.) It was contemplated by both 
parties that members of the general public would be invited onto 
the premises to skateboard. The Wades were concerned over 
liability and wanted liability insurance to be carried by Bob 
Iverson so that injuries would be covered. (Wade depo, p.31.) 
Although the Wades, on several occasions, asked about insurance 
coverage from Iverson, he never obtained insurance or provided 
proof of obtaining insurance to the Wades, in violation of the 
lease between them. (Wade depo, p. 35-36.) 
At the time the premises were leased by the Wades there 
was a missing drain cover in the bottom of one of the skateboard 
park runs, which was a dangerous condition for those using the 
park. Approximately fifteen (15) days after the lease of the 
skateboard park from the Wades to Iverson, the Appellant Troy 
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Darrington was injured on the premises. (Darrington Answers to 
Interrogatories, on file.) Darrington visited the park and knew 
there was one well known run with a missing cover. The same run 
always had the cover missing. On the day of the accident, 
however, the cover had been removed from the skateboard run that 
had originally had a drain cover, and was placed in a skateboard 
run that did not originally have a drain cover. Darrington's 
skateboard was caught in the uncovered drain while he was in 
motion and Darrington sustained serious injuries. (Affidavit of 
Darrington on file.) 
Since this case commenced on June 5, 1983 at 
Darrington's filing, the Wades have continually delayed, 
hindered, and obstructed the progression of this case, and have 
failed to timely respond to the discovery efforts of Darrington. 
Because of the elusive efforts of the Wades, Darrington had to 
resort to service by publication, which commenced in January of 
1984 and ended one month later. The Wades filed their Answer in 
March of 1984 and had delayed the case nine (9) months. (See 
Answers on file.) 
After receiving the Wades1 Answer, Darrington promptly 
sent Interrogatories to the Wades in March of 1984. (See file.) 
Customarily, the Wades failed to file a timely answer. 
Darrington had to file his first of several motions to compel 
answers in April of 1984. (See Court file.) Nearly a month 
after filing the motion to compel, but prior to a hearing, the 
Wades filed answers. 
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The Wades delayed this case further by changing counsel 
three different times. The Wades1 first attorney, Mr. Frank 
Smith, made a fruitless effort for several months to settle the 
case. These efforts only delayed the prosecution of Darrington's 
case. When settlement proved impossible, Darrington certified 
his case as ready for trial on November 8, 1984. At the time of 
Darrington's certification of readiness, Darrington's counsel had 
been waiting sixty (60) days for the Wades' response for 
settlement. (See, case file below and Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment at page 2) 
The Wades objected to Darrington's Certification of Readiness. A 
Pre-trial Conference was set for March of 1985. The Wades' 
second attorney, then not of record, Mr. Roger Sandack, appeared. 
Mr. Sandack had discovery reopened. For another nine (9) months 
Darrington tried to resolve the case. 
In November of 1985 the Wades sent their first set of 
Interrogatories, which were timely answered by Darrington. For a 
second time, Darrington certified his case as ready for trial, 
but again the Wades objected in June of 1986. The case was set 
for a Pre-trial Conference to commence in April of 1986. (See 
record below.) The Wades' second attorney claimed more discovery 
was needed, even though he had done nothing for six (6) months 
since becoming the Wades' counsel of record, except for sending 
Darrington interrogatories which were answered by Darrington four 
(4) months before this conference. Nevertheless, the Court 
failed to schedule the case for trial and opened up discovery 
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through June of 1986. However, the Wades did not conduct any 
further discovery even though they claimed it was necessary 
before trial could be set. 
Darrington sent another set of interrogatories to the 
Wades but they again failed to answer. Darrington filed a Motion 
to Compel in August of 1986 with a Notice of Hearing. At the 
hearing Honorable Judge Dean Condor (the first Judge in the case) 
entered an order compelling answers within ten (10) days, the 
violation of which would result in dismissal of Wades1 pleadings. 
Darrington mailed the proposed Order to the Court and to the 
Wades' counsel. The Wades did not timely object, but did 
nothing. A default judgment was sent to the Wades' counsel and 
the Court in October of 1986. No timely objection challenged the 
Order setting aside Wade's pleadings and entering judgment. 
After the judgment, the Wades' second attorney withdrew as 
counsel. The Wades' third set of attorneys objected to the 
default judgment. Despite the Wades' persistent delays for over 
three (3) years a new Judge assigned to the case (Judge Moffat) 
set aside the default judgment. 
Once again Darrington sought to prosecute his case. 
Depositions of Stanley Wade were scheduled and attempted on 
February 1, 1988, March 18, 1988, July 19, 1988, October 5, 1988 
and March 30, 1989, and on each of these occasions except for the 
last, Stanley Wade either refused to appear or else appeared 
without having complied with Requests for Production of Documents 
to enable the deposition to be taken. Finally, the Court ordered 
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that the deposition of Wade be taken on or about May 27, 1988, 
and notwithstanding the Court's order, Wade failed again to 
appear. As a result of Wade's failure to appear, the Court 
entered another Default Judgment against the Wades on or about 
November 14, 1988. The Court stated: 
The Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, has not 
performed in accordance with the prior Order 
of the Court compelling discovery, and has 
repeatedly failed to perform his 
responsibilities under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(See November 4, 1988 Order at page 2.) Seven months later, on 
or about May 25, 1989 the Court, after setting aside this second 
judgment, entered a summary judgment for the Wades and refused to 
re-enter the previous judgment. The Wades were successful in 
delaying Darrington's case for almost six (6) years. Darrington, 
as a result, has incurred unnecessary legal costs and 
difficulties in preparing his case because the Wades have 
successfully inhibited, a prompt discovery. Darrington's case 
represents the longest and most time consuming case ever handled 
by the firm Maddox, Nelson & Snuffer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court failed to follow the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in setting aside the default judgment in this 
case. Nearly ninety (90) days after entering a judgment the 
district court erroneously set it aside pursuant to an objection 
to a proposed order and Motion to Reconsider. This contravenes 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifically require a 
motion to set aside an already entered judgment. Never in this 
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case did the Wades enter such a motion and their objection to the 
proposed order failed to satisfy the rules. Nevertheless, the 
Court set aside its judgment. To allow such an abuse of 
discretion would continue to delay this case further and deny 
Darrington due process. 
The district court has abused its discretion in failing 
to reinstate Darrington's judgment against the Wades. For over 
four (4) years the Wades have delayed this case. The Wades have 
continually refused to answer interrogatories and admissions, 
have refused to cooperate in depositions at least four (4) times, 
have changed counsel three (3) times and have objected to 
Darrington's readiness for trial at least twice and have obtained 
an erroneous summary judgment nearly five (5) years after the 
commencement of Darrington's suit. Darrington has not received 
the benefits of a prompt discovery and has not received a just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of his claim. The district 
court has a duty to use its discretion in order to resolve claims 
as inexpensively as possible. The district court has entered two 
(2) judgments because of the delays in this case caused by the 
Wades behavior. However, they have on both occasions set aside 
those judgments and in so doing have abused their discretion. 
The district court cannot enter a summary judgment on 
the Wades behalf because genuine issues of fact prevent the court 
from ruling as a matter of law. The essential elements of a 
negligence action, such as this, create genuine issues of fact. 
These questions cannot be answered as a matter of law but require 
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a jury determination. For instance, did the Wades have a duty of 
reasonable care to prevent Darrington's injury? Did they breach 
that duty of care? And finally, did they know of the dangerous 
condition which caused Darrington's injury prior to their leasing 
the skateboard park? These questions are material to answering 
the question of whether the Wades are liable in this case for 
Darrington's injuries. They in effect prevent the district court 
from ruling as a matter of law and granting the Wades summary 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court has abused its discretion in 
refusing to reinstate its judgment against the Wades. 
A. Darrington is entitled to a judgment against the 
Wades because they have refused to cooperate in 
discovery. 
The district court has abused its discretion by 
entering a summary judgment against Darrington, whose right to a 
prompt discovery and a "just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination" of his action has been violated by this court. 
(Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.) The Utah Supreme Court 
is clearly opposed to tactical delays in discovery as were used 
by the Wades in this case. The Wades's conduct in this case 
warrants a reversal of the district court's summary judgment in 
their behalf and a reinstatement of the judgment which was 
entered against the Wades due to their refusal to cooperate in 
discovery for approximately five (5) years. 
In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that: 
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the sanction of default judgment is justified 
where there has been a frustration of the 
judicial process, viz,, where the failure to 
respond to discovery impedes trial on the 
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain 
whether the allegations . . . have any 
factual merit. 
W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Parkwest Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 
734, 738 (Utah 1977). In that case the defendant refused to 
cooperate with the plaintiff who requested interrogatories and 
admissions to complete discovery. Nearly one (1) year after the 
plaintiffs served the defendant with the first set of 
interrogatories, the district court entered a default judgment as 
a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In upholding that Default decision, the Utah Supreme 
Court reasoned: 
A party to an action has a right to have the 
benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not 
only in order that he may have ample time to 
prepare his case, but also in order to bring 
to light facts which may entitled him to 
summary judgment or induce settlement prior 
to trial. The rules were designed to secure 
"the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action," Rule 1. (Id. 
at 738) 
As in Parkwest Village, the Wades have refused to 
cooperate in discovery. However, not only have the Wades refused 
to answer interrogatories and answer admissions, they have 
refused to cooperate in depositions at least four (4) times, they 
have changed counsel three (3) times, and have objected to 
Darrington's readiness for trial at least twice. The Wades have 
exceeded the one (1) year delay of the defendant in Parkwest 
Village by at least three and a half (3 1/2) years. Darrington, 
because of the Wades1 conduct, has not received the benefits of a 
prompt discovery which would enable him to acquire the best 
available evidence and facts that would support a judgment in his 
behalf. In short, he has not received the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of his action as the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure contemplate. The district court has abused its 
discretion in setting aside a judgment approximately ninety (90) 
days after the judgment had been entered. 
B. The district court abused its discretion in 
setting aside an entered default decision pursuant to 
an objection to a proposed order. 
The district court failed to follow the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in setting aside Darrington's judgment against 
the Wades. Rule 59 requires a motion to be made within 10 days. 
There was no motion for a new trial or to amend judgment ever 
filed. The only motion asked for reconsideration. This Court 
has held that such a Motion does not stay the time for appeal. 
The Wades did not appeal timely. Nonetheless, the lower court 
altered the judgment without any procedural justification. 
As to the setting aside of the judgment, the Court 
lacked authority to do so. The time for filing an appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court had expired at the time the Defendant 
pursued its Motion. The Defendant had the obligation to either: 
1) within 10 days file a motion to alter or amend judgment or 
motion for a new trial, or 2) within one month file an appeal,. 
Albretson v. Judd. 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985) The Defendant's 
actions are merely an effort to breathe new life into a case that 
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has already become settled, final, and unappealable. This Court 
should reverse the lower Court and reinstate the judgment nunc 
pro tunc to November 14, 1988. The Defendant Wade exercised 
gross disregard for the Rules of Procedure and was flagrant in 
his lack of cooperation in the discovery process. 
In this case the Wades' motion was an objection to a 
proposed order. The order had in actuality already been entered. 
The court set aside its judgment even though the appropriate 
motion had not been filed. 
The Wades have never filed a motion to set aside the 
default judgment already entered according to Rule 60(b)(1). The 
District court erroneously set aside its default judgment 
pursuant to an objection to a proposed order and motion to 
reconsider and has effectively rewritten the Rules. Viewing this 
in conjunction with the Wades' tactical delays in this case the 
district court has abused is discretion and the Utah Supreme 
Court has a duty to reinstate the previous judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court is completely justified in 
overruling the district court's summary judgment and reinstating 
the judgment entered against the Wades as a result of their 
refusing to cooperate in discovery. Darrington has suffered by 
incurring unnecessary legal costs and in being unable to prepare 
an effective case. A default judgment is justified by the Wades' 
"persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." 
Parkwest, supra. 
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II. 
The district court cannot grant the Wades summary 
judgment because genuine issues of fact exist. 
The district court incorrectly granted the Wade's 
motion for summary judgment according to Rule 56(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule states in pertinent part: 
Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Genuine issues of fact prevent the district court from 
granting the Wades' summary judgment as a matter of law. Because 
there exists genuine issues of fact in this case, the district 
court's summary judgment should be reversed. Even if this Court 
elects not to reinstate the judgment against Wade, Darrington is 
entitled to a decision on the merits. Viewing the facts most 
favorably to Darrington there is enough to justify a finding in 
his behalf. 
The essential elements of a negligence action create 
genuine issues of fact in this case. The elements of a 
negligence action include "(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by 
the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the 
causation, both actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the 
suffering of damages by the plaintiff." Williams v. Melbv, 699 
P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
To determine whether the Wades owed a duty of 
reasonable care to Darrington a number of factors must be 
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considered. (1) the moral blame attached to the Defendants' 
conduct; (2) the policy of preventing future harm; (3) the 
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the 
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach; (4) availability, cost and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved; (5) foreseeability of harm to 
the Plaintiff; (6) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered 
injury and (7) the closeness of the connection between the 
defendants conduct and the injuries suffered. Rowland v. 
Christian. 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
The Wades are morally blame-worthy for the injury 
incurred by Darrington. By their nature, skateboard parks are 
inherently dangerous. Those who lease such businesses must be 
held to a higher standard of care because there is a great risk 
of injury involved with skateboard parks. Landlords who rent 
such facilities to tenants have a responsibility to insure that 
the premises are free from known dangers that could cause 
injuries. This responsibility prevents future harm to patrons 
using such facilities. The Wades1 burden in purchasing a new 
drain cover before renting the facilities to Iverson can hardly 
be compared to the $32,392.90 incurred by Darrington as a result 
of his injuries. Moreover, the Wades could have easily purchased 
insurance for themselves or required their tenants to be insured 
for the risks involved with the skateboard park. The injury that 
Darrington suffered was foreseeable as in Williams, supra. The 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that landlords have a duty to make 
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conditions reasonably safe, especially when the premises are 
leased for purposes of admitting the public and a member of the 
public is injured. (Williams, supra at 726-27.) In light of the 
other considerations Darrington's injury should have been 
foreseen by the Wades. In fact, the Wades were concerned about 
their potential liability for injuries, and they attempted to 
require their tenants to obtain insurance. In this case, 
however, the Wades failed to require their tenant to have 
liability insurance. It is also certain that Darrington suffered 
injuries as a result of his skateboard accident. The Wades' duty 
in this case as well as the immense risk of injuries involved 
with skateboard parks warrants a close connection to Darrington's 
injury. A genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the Wades 
had a duty of reasonable care toward Darrington. It is also 
clear, as to causation, that the injury could not have occurred 
but for the Wade's leasing of the premises without the drain 
cover. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the question of 
breach of a defendant's duty to a plaintiff is a question of fact 
for the jury. (Williams, supra.) Genuine issues of fact are 
raised in this case concerning the Wades' breach of their duty to 
Darrington. Did the Wades know or should they have known of the 
defects in the skateboard ramp prior to the lease? Could the 
Wades have learned of the defective condition? Because these 
questions exist in this case, the district court cannot rule as a 
matter of law in granting the Wades summary judgment. These 
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questions are genuine issues of fact that must be determined only 
by a jury. 
Oregon has proposed a test for determining landlord's 
liability to other persons besides tenants on their leased 
property. The Oregon Supreme court stated: 
"The nature of the defect might be such that 
the landlord would reasonably expect that the 
tenant would take steps to remedy the defect 
or otherwise to safeguard persons entering 
them at his invitation." 
Bellikka v. Green, 762 P.2d 997, 1008 (Or. 1988). In developing 
this standard the Oregon Supreme Court held that a landlord 
should not escape liability for reasonable, foreseeable harms. 
Id. at 1007. The Court also outlined a number of factors to 
determine whether a landlord would reasonably expect a tenant to 
remedy defects. A tenant is not expected to remedy dangerous 
conditions if: he has a short term lease, he has already agreed 
to repair, there is an undisclosed dangerous condition known only 
by the landlord, or the landlord has retained control of a part 
of the lease. Id. 
In applying the Oregon standard there exists genuine 
issues of fact as to whether the Wades should have expected their 
tenant to remedy the defect that created the risk of harm to 
Darrington. In this case the tenant was under a short term lease 
for one year. The defect existed at the time of the lease. It 
is unclear from the evidence whether the tenant knew of the 
dangerous condition or whether the Wades were the only ones who 
knew of the dangerous condition. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's summary judgment on behalf of the 
Wades should be reversed and the prior judgment reinstated in 
Darringtonfs behalf. The district court cannot rule as a matter 
of law against Darrington in this case because there are genuine 
issues of fact. The Wades have successfully delayed this case 
for five (5) years, and Darrington has not received the benefits 
of prompt discovery and as a result has received irreparable harm 
at the hands of the district court. Finally, the district court 
failed to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in setting 
aside its default judgment. The Utah Supreme Court must correct 
this abuse of discretion exhibited by the district court by 
reinstating Darrington1s judgment. 
DATED this 3 > ^  day of August,J^S^C n 
Snuff! 
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